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// DOSSIER — us-investigates-f35-stealth-components-diversion-hong-kong

ASIA-PACIFIC AMERICAS UNITED STATES AUSTRALIA CHINA AIR INDUSTRY POLICY

US Investigates Diversion of Sensitive F-35 Stealth Components to Hong Kong

REL_TIME: 23 Sep 2026 07:15Z · LANG: EN

// Disseminate
US Investigates Diversion of Sensitive F-35 Stealth Components to Hong Kong
US Army Corps of Engineers – Mississippi River Commission, Harold N. Fisk · Public domain · source

US lawmakers and the Pentagon are investigating an incident in which a shipment of sensitive F-35 Lightning II fighter jet components, including a cockpit canopy coated with stealth radar-absorbent materials, was unexpectedly diverted to Hong Kong. The parts were being transported from Australia to the United States for repairs by an intermediary working for Lockheed Martin. While there is no public evidence that Chinese authorities have accessed the components, the diversion to a Chinese special administrative region has raised significant national security and reverse-engineering concerns.

// Background

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter relies on a complex multinational supply chain where spare parts are managed in a shared global pool. Although Australia serves as a regional Indo-Pacific maintenance hub operating 72 F-35As, it currently lacks the capability to repair cockpit canopies, requiring items to be shipped to the US. The diversion occurs amid historical concerns over Chinese espionage targeting F-35 data, as well as past Government Accountability Office findings that flagged chronic visibility and inventory-tracking issues across more than one million spare parts.

// Key Developments

  • A shipment of unserviceable F-35 components en route from Australia to the US for repairs was rerouted across the Pacific to Hong Kong.
  • The diverted items reportedly include an F-35 cockpit canopy coated with specialized radar-absorbent stealth materials.
  • The Pentagon's F-35 Joint Program Office confirmed the shipping issue and is collaborating with industry partners to retrieve the parts and implement safeguards.
  • The House Armed Services Committee and other national security committees have received multiple briefings on the incident.
  • The incident underscores ongoing supply-chain tracking vulnerabilities highlighted by past GAO audits reporting over one million missing F-35 spare parts.

// Timeline

  1. A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identifies over one million missing F-35 spare parts across a five-year tracking period.

  2. A shipment of unserviceable F-35 components sent from Australia to the US for repairs is diverted across the Pacific to Hong Kong.

  3. State Department and Pentagon officials deliver the first briefings regarding the diversion to congressional national security committee staff.

  4. Politico first publicly reports the diversion of the F-35 components to Hong Kong.

  5. The Pentagon's F-35 Joint Program Office and House Armed Services Committee publicly confirm the investigation and forthcoming congressional briefings.

// Perspectives

[US Pentagon / F-35 Joint Program Office]

Acknowledged the diversion of unserviceable components and stated it is actively investigating, attempting retrieval, and enacting safeguards to prevent recurrence.

[US Congress (House Armed Services Committee)]

Engaged in active oversight and receiving formal briefings to determine the breach's cause and potential national security risks.

[Lockheed Martin]

Refrained from commenting on specific shipments due to security concerns, while affirming adherence to US regulations and rigorous transport safeguards.

[Chinese Embassy / Hong Kong Government]

The Chinese Embassy stated it was unfamiliar with the incident, while the Hong Kong government declined to comment on individual cases.

// Quotes

“The F-35 Joint Program Office and Office of the Secretary of War are aware of a shipment issue of unserviceable F-35 Lightning II components. We are actively working with U.S. authorities and industry partners to retrieve these components, investigate the incident, and place safeguards to avoid a future occurrence.”

[F-35 Joint Program Office] — Official statement confirming the shipping issue and the ongoing retrieval and investigation efforts.

“The committee is aware of this issue and we've received multiple briefings on it. Lawmakers are continuing their oversight of the incident.”

[Heather Vaughan] — Statement from the House Armed Services Committee spokesperson confirming congressional oversight.

“It's no secret that China has been aggressively trying to get F-35 data through electronic espionage, among other means. Having a physical component could give Chinese intelligence even more to go on and help verify or refine information obtained through other means.”

[J.J. Gertler] — Assessment by a military aviation analyst regarding the security implications of physical access to F-35 parts.

// Related Briefs